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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2002, 16 (5), 685–694

BRIEF REPORT
Emotional episodes facilitate word recall
Paula T. Hertel and Colleen Parks
Trinity University, San Antonio, TX, USA

Dysphoric and nondysphoric college students described self-generated images of
themselves interacting with the referents of neutral nouns; the nouns were paired
with adjectives that changed their emotional meaning (e.g., cruise ship, cargo ship,
sinking ship). On the subsequent unexpected test, the nouns from emotional
pairings were more frequently recalled than were those from neutral pairings,
regardless of their valence or congruence with the students’ mood. An examination
of the initial descriptions revealed that emotional images were more distinctive, but
not in a pattern correlated with recall of the corresponding nouns.

A common belief about memory is that emotional events are better remembered—not the
traumatic events that are thought to cause repression, of course, but merely the very
pleasant or very unpleasant events of common experience. Indeed, studies of memory for
such naturally occurring events seem to provide the strongest evidence for believing in
the memorial advantage of emotion (see Christianson & Engelberg, 1999). As researchers
commonly acknowledge, however, this kind of evidence is difficult to interpret, because
emotional features of real-world events covary with other features. In considering that
emotional events are rare, for example, we might wonder whether their distinctiveness
instead of their emotional quality underlies the memorial advantage. Considerations such
as these have encouraged controlled laboratory investigations.
Laboratory investigations of emotional memory typically control some conditions for
processing emotional and nonemotional materials. Just as is true with naturally occurring
events, however, experimental materials that differ in their emotional value also differ in
other ways. Even the use of single words—personality traits, for example—is subject to
these concerns, because we can never be sure that our attempts to control frequency of
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occurrence, associative strength, or numerous other characteristics have been truly successful. Published normative ratings are obtained in contexts that differ from the ones in
which we present the materials, for example. And we rarely control for the degree of
conceptual coherence among words in the various emotion-related categories. These and
similar difficulties have been acknowledged in research on emotion and memory (e.g.,
Mayer & Bower, 1985, Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
The experiment in this report takes a step toward inferring a causal role for episoderelated emotion in word recall. In brief, we varied the initial episodes for encountering
neutral nouns, in order to change their emotional value from neutral to positive or
negative (also see Hertel, 2000). A similar approach recently has been reported by
Reisberg and Heuer (2000), who studied memory for a series of neutral slides presented
against the backdrop of an emotional or nonemotional story. Although both approaches
clearly do not eliminate alternative explanations of memory differences (e.g., the distinctiveness of the prior-processing episode), they enjoy certain advantages. The main
advantage to the present method lies in its control of the within-valence coherence of the
materials. By using the same nouns in all conditions and varying the emotional valence of
the initial processing episode, we reduced the viability of intra-valence cueing as a
competing explanation of differences associated with emotion.
Concerns with differences in within-valence conceptual coherence have troubled some
investigators of mood-congruent recall in depressed states. Greater coherence among
negative words that are conceptually associated with depression (e.g., death, failure,
sadness) might boost otherwise low levels of recall by depressed participants, through a
process by which additional items are cued by previously recalled words. Believing that
our alternative procedure would reduce intra-valence cueing, we included dysphoric
mood as a grouping factor in the design of this experiment.
The pursuit of conceptual bases for mood-congruent recall is important beyond suspicions of a confounding role for conceptual coherence. Mood and one’s awareness of
mood might serve to organise initial processing and later recall in much the same way as
do category names. Some researchers have asked whether the mood or emotional state of
the participant is even necessary for obtaining mood-congruent memory effects (e.g.,
Perrig & Perrig, 1988). This issue has been interpreted as a question of the demand
characteristics of laboratory mood studies, but it need not be. Regardless of demand, in
studies that employ mood-induction procedures, recall might sometimes be influenced by
the conceptual connections between the coherent set of words in each valence category
and the materials used in the induction procedure itself (see Parrott & Hertel, 1999). In
this regard, Varner and Ellis (1998) developed a ‘‘schema induction’’ procedure on the
topic of writing essays that was similar to mood induction procedures but involved
thoughts of essay writing instead of feelings. Later the students who underwent this
procedure produced ‘‘essay-congruent’’ recall, similar to the effects of a sadness
induction on recall of sadness-related words. Similarly, in studies performed with mooddisordered participants, evidence of mood congruence is frequently restricted to materials
that are specifically related to depression and processed in self-referential terms (see
Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996). Through such procedures, self-concept can conceptually organise the recall of interrelated items, particularly when participants are
aware of the relevance of their emotional state. In short, both types of investigations—
induction or natural state—are logically capable of producing mood-congruent recall on
the basis of conceptual connections among the materials to be recalled and other aspects
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of the method. Our secondary aim was therefore to test the hypothesis of mood-congruent
recall while minimising conceptual connections and their potential for differential cueing.
If obtained, such evidence should help establish mood-congruent recall as a phenomenon
separable from other organisations of meaning (see Bower, 1992). Fundamentally,
however, we were interested in establishing the effects of individual emotional episodes,
regardless of mood.

METHOD
To manipulate the emotional valence of the materials to be recalled, we first paired
neutral nouns with three different adjectives. For example, depending on the participant’s
assignment to materials, the noun cottage appeared in phase 1 as romantic cottage, stone
cottage, or gloomy cottage; the noun mammal appeared as adorable mammal, sleeping
mammal, or hunted mammal. Participants were instructed to form an image of each word
pair that included themselves, to describe the image in a sentence, and to rate the
emotional value of the image. Instructions for self-referential processing were used in
order to increase the likelihood of finding mood-congruent recall (see Watkins, Matthews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). The rating of emotional value provided a manipulation check.

Participants and design
Trinity University students filled out copies of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) in the classroom of their introductory
psychology course. Blind to the means of selection, students scoring 5 or below (classified as nondysphoric) or 9 and above (classified as dysphoric) were later recruited by
phone for the experiment. The term dysphoria is used to convey nondiagnosed negative
affect, as measured by such self-report inventories as the BDI. Students with scores
ranging from 6 to 8 were not invited to participate, in order to make the two groups more
distinct and avoid loss of data from shifting scores on the second administration of the
BDI. We set aside the data from participants whose end-of-session BDI scores fell outside
the original category (n = 6) 1 and replaced them with data from additional participants, in
order to preserve counterbalancing.
The final sample included 20 nondysphori c and 20 dysphoric students. In each mood
group, four participants were assigned to each of five materials conditions. The first
materials condition in each mood group was assigned to three women and one man; the
others were each assigned to two women and two men. In each condition, participants
encountered positive, neutral, and negative word pairs; the emotionality of the episodes
varied within subjects.

1
One participant was an exception. She originally scored 2 but then scored 13 during the
experimental session, conducted 3 weeks later. We used her data in the dysphoric condition, due to
scarcity of dysophoric participants at the end of the semester.
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Materials
Neutral nouns were selected if they contained four to seven letters and were rated less
than 4 on a 7-point emotionality scale, between 3 and 5 on a 7-point goodness scale, and
greater than 5 on both a 7-point imagery and a 7-point concreteness scale (Paivio, Yuille,
& Madigan, 1968; Rubin & Friendly, 1986). Those characteristics, as well as frequency
of occurrence (KucË era & Francis, 1967), were used to balance the five lists of 15 nouns.
(Five lists were used in order to develop multiple sets of materials, but only three lists
were used for each participant in this experiment.)
Each noun was paired with three adjectives that were chosen to encourage positive,
neutral, and negative images when combined individually with the noun (e.g., cruise ship,
cargo ship, sinking ship). Pilot ratings for the emotional value of images induced by the
pairs were also used to balance the five lists of 15 nouns.2
Five materials conditions were formed by rotating the five critical lists across positive,
neutral, and negative pairings (for positive/neutral/negative assignments, respectively:
lists 1/2/3, 2/3/4, 3/4/5, 4/5/1, or 5/1/2). Equal numbers of participants in each mood
group were assigned to each rotation scheme.
The list of positive, negative, and neutral pairs for the imaging task in phase 1 was
ordered by block randomisation, with two pairs of each valence within each block of six
pairs (and one of each in the last block of three pairs). The order of valence position was
held constant across the materials conditions. In addition, three buffer pairs, one of each
valence, were added to the beginning of the list and three others to the end.

Procedure
Blind to the mood classification of the participants, experimenters described the sessions
as a series of different tasks, joined together for convenience. The first task was described
as an effort to construct materials to be used in future experiments.
Rating phase. On each trial, participants were asked: (a) to form a mental image of
the word pair that included themselves; (b) to make up a short sentence that included the
pair and described the image; and (c) to rate the degree and type of emotion associated
with the mental image, on a scale of 1 (very positive) to 9 (very negative). Each pair was
displayed for 10 s, during which time the participants were asked to construct the image
and report the sentence, loudly enough to be recorded on the tape recorder. If, for
example, they saw the pair deserted beach, they might imagine themselves walking along
a deserted beach; with the image in place they should then describe it by saying
something like: I am walking along a deserted beach at dawn. After 10 s, the pair was
replaced with the rating scale, and when the emotion rating was typed the program
advanced to the next pair. (These procedures were controlled by Superlab.) The
participants were left alone in the room to perform the task, having been assured that
someone other than the experimenter would eventually listen to the tape, unattached to
their name, for the purpose of classifying the sentences along various dimensions.

2

A total of 62 students performed the pilot ratings, given instructions identical to those used in
phase 1 of the experiment . Each student rated each noun in only one pairing and used a scale ranging
from 1 (very positive) to 9 (very negative). The average rating across items was 3.3 for positive, 4.5
for neutral, and 6.7 for negative pairings, F(2, 148) = 531, MSe = .425.
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Recall test. To reduce recency effects and provide a foil to maintain the cover story
regarding unrelated tasks, we next gave the participants an exercise to find as many
hidden figures in a series of drawings as they could find within 5 minutes. When the time
was up, we asked them to recall nouns (and only the nouns) from the first rating task.
When they recalled as many as they could they informed the experimenter, who then told
them that ‘‘some people find that it helps to guess at this point, because guessing
sometimes turns out to be right. Try hard to recall five more nouns, and guess if it helps
you.’’ The experimenter drew a line beneath the initially recalled words before asking for
the additional words. This forcing procedure was used to counteract the possibility of
mood-related response criteria.
Mood forms. The final set of tasks was described as a collection of self-report
inventories. Participants filled out copies of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to indicate present mood state and a BDI to
indicate mood state during the past week; they sealed them in an envelope to be passed
along, unopened, to the supervising faculty member.

RESULTS
Separate ANOVAs were performed on the percentage of nouns recalled: (a) from the 15
trials from each type of pairing; and (b) from just those trials on which the participants’
ratings of emotional valence matched the pre-experimental categories. Additional analyses concerned characteristics of the sentences produced during phase 1. Each analysis
included between-subjects factors for gender and mood group (dysphoric or nondysphoric). The within-subjects factor for type of pairing was treated as two planned
orthogonal comparisons, one for the effect of emotion (positive and negative vs. neutral)
and the other for the type of emotion (positive vs. negative, omitting neutral). The
significance level was set at .05 for all analyses.

Percentage recalled from all trials
The first two rows of Table 1 report the mean percentages (out of 15) recalled before
participants were asked to recall five additional nouns, and the second two rows report the
mean percentages recalled before and after the request. The patterns of results from the
two scoring methods were the same and showed that nouns from emotional pairs were
recalled more often than were nouns from neutral pairs, regardless of mood group.
The ANOVA performed on the percentage of the 15 nouns in each valence category,
recalled before and after recall was forced, revealed a significant effect of emotion
(positive and negative vs. neutral), F(1, 36) = 32.16, MSe = 116.94, p < .001; emotional
pairings produced better recall than did neutral pairings. The type of emotion (positive vs.
negative) was clearly irrelevant, F < 1.0.3
3

All other significant effects involved gender. Although we had no specific interest in gender
differences in recall, we report the outcomes for those who might. Women recalled more nouns than
did men, particularly when they were dysphoric, as revealed by the significant interaction of mood
group and gender, F(1, 36) = 4.61, MSe = 395.25. Means were 48% vs. 40%, respectively for women
and men in the nondysphori c group, and 53% vs. 29% in the dysphoric group. (Obviously, the main
effect of gender was significant.) The gender differences did not appear to be related to mood
differences; men and women did not produce significantly different end-of-session BDI scores or
PANAS scores, Fs < 1.0.
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TABLE 1
Mean percentages of nouns recalled
Phase 1 pairs
Mood group

Positive

Neutral

Negative

Free recall
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric

42.0
38.3

31.0
31.0

40.7
41.3

Total recall
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric

49.7
45.0

36.3
33.7

46.0
47.3

Adjusted recall
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric

55.8 (9.1)
51.0 (9.2)

34.7 (10.4)
25.2 (6.6)

43.8 (8.2)
47.2 (9.3)

Note: n = 20. Total recall included items recalled after the additional five
words were requested. Adjusted recall refers to the percentage recalled out of
the number of items that were judged by the participants to be in the same
valence category as we had placed them. The mean numbers of items so
judged are presented parenthetically.

Percentage recalled from the matching trials
Having found no evidence for mood-congruent recall in the previous analysis, we decided
to examine possible differences in the extent to which participants’ image ratings corresponded to the experimenter-determined categories, in order to discover whether such
differences might have confounded the recall results. We therefore scored the number of
ratings in each of the pairing categories that matched the valence of the category. Ratings
of 1–3 for positive pairs, 4–6 for neutral pairs, and 7–9 for negative pairs were counted as
matching. ANOVA revealed that the difference between emotional trials and neutral trials
in the number of matches depended on mood group, F(1, 36) = 9.26, MSe = 13.17,
p < .01.4 The means are reported in parentheses in Table 1. Dysphoric participants
reported neutral images for intended neutral trials much less frequently than did nondysphoric participants, and less frequently than they reported emotional images for
intended emotional trials. It seemed advisable, given significant differences of any kind,
to rescore recall proportionally to the matching trials alone.
An ANOVA was performed on the percentage of nouns recalled from trials on which
the participants’ ratings matched our categories. Apart from the main effect of gender
(with women recalling more words), the only statistically significant effects involved the
type of pairings. As can be seen in the adjusted means in the last two rows of Table 1, the
effect of emotion (positive and negative vs. neutral) was significant, F(1, 36) = 42.96,

4

The only other significant effect in the overall analysis was the gender main effect, F(1, 36) =
6.22, MSe = 7.26. Women used higher ratings.
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MSe = 222.84; p < .001, and replicated the outcomes from the other scoring methods.
With this method of scoring, however, the nouns producing positive images were recalled
significantly more frequently than those producing negative images, F(1, 36) = 4.63, MSe
= 252.92, p < .05. Although the pattern of means suggested mood-congruent recall, that
conclusion was not supported by a significant interaction of mood group with positive
versus negative trials, F(1, 36) = 1.15, p < .30.

Sentence characteristics
The sentences generated by participants to describe their images provided additional
information about the manipulation of emotional episodes in phase 1. We constructed
three measures: (1) the number of words in each sentence, a crude measure of elaboration;
(2) the extent to which the sentence included the self, a measure of self-referential
processing; and (3) a distinctiveness rating. Two scorers independently evaluated each
sentence, their scores were averaged, and then means were submitted to ANOVAs, with
factors for mood group, gender, and the two orthogonal comparisons for type of pairing.
The first two measures failed to show significant differences, p-values > .30. 5 Sentences
contained an average of 9.4 words, overall, and were rated 2.1 on a 3-point scale of selfreferencing.
The measure of event distinctiveness was recorded on a scale of 1 (everyday event) to
5 (infrequent occurrence). Mean ratings (3.0 for positive, 2.6 for neutral, and 3.6 for
negative pairs) were higher for emotional pairs than for neutral, F(1, 34) = 110.89, MSe =
.101, p < .001. They were also higher for negative pairs than for positive pairs, F(1, 34) =
51.86, MSe = .104, p < .001.

Separate imagery ratings
Subsequent to this experiment, we collected ratings concerning the images generated for
the 75 nouns in each of the three pairings. Participants (N = 36) rated 25 nouns in positive
pairing, 25 in neutral, and 25 in negative; the set of 25 was counterbalanced with valence
of the pairing across participants (from a similar pool of students at Trinity University).
They were given instructions from the first phase of the recall experiment, except that
instead of emotional value they rated the vividness of the image (from a value of 1 for
very blurry to 9 for very vivid) and then the ease with which it was formed (from a value
of 1 for very difficult to 9 for very easy). The mean correlation between the two ratings,
calculated across items for each participant, was .74, which was significantly different
from 1.0, t(35) = 7.38, p < .001. Thus, the participants did not generally respond as if the
two measures tapped the same characteristic.
The ratings on each scale were averaged across items within the type of pairing, and
these means for each participant were submitted to a repeated-measures analysis of
variance. The main effect of valence of the pairing was statistically significant for both
vividness ratings, (F(2, 70) = 33.24, MSe = .296, p < .001) and ratings of ease of
producing an image, (F(2, 70) = 29.29, MSe = .327, p < .001). Negative pairings produced
lower ratings of both vividness (5.6) and ease (5.7) than did positive (6.5 for vividness
and 6.6 for ease) and neutral pairings (6.6 for both).
5

For all these sentence measures, the tapes from two male participants (one in each mood group)
could not be evaluated, due to low volume.
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Mood measures
The average score on the BDI in the dysphoric group was 17, which indicates a level of
self-reported depressed mood that is typical or perhaps slightly higher than what is typical
for studies performed with dysphoric students. (The mean BDI score in the nondysphoric
group was 3.) The PANAS was administered in addition to the BDI in order to measure
momentary affect, both positive and negative dimensions. ANOVA performed on the
scores revealed a significant interaction of dimension with mood group, F(1, 38) = 29.51,
MSe = 42.83, p < .001. Dysphoric participants scored lower than nondysphori c participants on the positive scale (M = 28 vs. 35) and higher on the negative scale (M = 26
vs. 18).

DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that individual emotional episodes facilitate word recall. The
episodes were created as self-referential images by the participants themselves; the
images were invoked by the adjective that accompanied each noun and that changed its
emotional meaning. When the valence of the pair was established purely on the basis of
pilot ratings, both positive and negative episodes produced higher levels of noun recall
than did neutral episodes. When the valence was defined in terms of the participants’
agreement with our categories, an additional difference obtained: Positive episodes
produced better recall than did negative episodes.
The pattern of means suggests that the positive (vs. negative) bias was particularly
strong for nondysphoric participants, in line with Matt, Vazquez, and Campbell’s (1992)
meta-analysis, but the interaction did not approach significance. Although low power for
detecting this interaction should certainly be suspected, we cannot put too much stock in
any analysis that produces differential percentages when the denominators vary to the
degree observed in this study. In particular, the dysphoric participants less frequently used
the mid-range of the scale in reporting the emotional value of their images. Yet, the
patterns obtained from both scoring methods do suggest that mood congruence might be
found by pursuing variations on this method of constructing processing episodes.
The main result, once again, was the facilitative effect of emotional images, compared
to neutral images. Clearly, it is important to consider the nature of these images. First
(with apologies to Gertrude Stein), a rose is not a rose is not a rose. A wilted rose in a
corsage found at the scene of a fatal car accident is perhaps a very different rose than the
small rose in the vase on the lunch counter or the first dewy rose of spring in the garden of
one’s childhood. And the way that one comes to remember the word rose should at least
partly correspond to those differences.
In order to obtain additional information about the processing basis for the advantages
of emotional episodes, we took several measures of the image descriptions generated for
the paired items. Although their descriptions did not differ in length or degree of selfinvolvement, with respect to any of our factors, our measures were crude. Perhaps the
emotional images were more elaborate or involved the self in ways we did not measure.
We do know that the negative pairings produced the most distinctive (or rarely occurring)
episodes, and there is good reason to believe both that emotional contexts should be
distinctive (see Eich & Schooler, 2000; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992) and that distinctive
events are better recalled (see Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). In our results, however,
distinctiveness was not significantly correlated with recall. The negative pairs produced
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higher mean distinctiveness ratings, but the positive pairs produced a higher percentage
recalled (according to the proportional analysis only). Also worth noting were the null
findings that distinctiveness ratings were not significantly correlated with any measure of
recall, computed both within the valence categories and by collapsing across them.
Moreover, compared to the positive and neutral pairings, the negative pairings were
judged (by other students in a separate experiment) to produce less vivid images and to
produce them less easily. Thus, we know that the emotional episodes facilitate recall in
ways that are not easily understood by the imagery measures we recorded. Nevertheless,
we think the main findings are important. Why?
The results demonstrate that the degree of emotion inherent in individual processing
episodes can affect the probability of recall. This item-specific form of our manipulation
contrasts with more global means of varying emotion while holding constant the nominal
events to be recalled (e.g., nonverbal communication in Hertel & Narvaez, 1986, story
narrative in Reisberg & Heuer, 2000). In all of these methods of varying the emotional
quality of the episode, the functional stimulus no doubt changes along with the valence,
but probably not to the degree that characterises the use of different categories of emotional and neutral words. Moreover, our method reduces the role played by differential
conceptual coherence across the categories of emotional and neutral words. A sinking
ship might well be a different ship from a cruise ship, but the conceptual coherence
among sinking ship, racist poster, and pathetic king is likely to be similar to the
coherence among cruise ship, humorous poster, and noble king, or among cargo ship,
laminated poster, and reigning king. As a matter for further research, we recommend such
control as one way of pursuing issues of emotional memory and mood-congruent
memory.
Manuscript received 6 December 2000
Revised manuscript received 31 July 2001
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